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BY ANY OTHER NAME:
RATIONAL BASIS INQUIRY AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S FIDUCIARY DUTY OF CARE

Gary Lawson*
Guy I. Seidman**

Abstract

Under modern law, federal legislation is subject to “rational basis review” under the
doctrinal rubric of “substantive due process.” That construction of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause is notoriously difficult to justify as a matter of original constitutional meaning.
Something very similar to substantive due process, however, is easily justifiable as a matter of
original constitutional meaning once one understands that the Constitution, for interpretative
purposes, is best seen as a kind of fiduciary instrument. Fiduciary instruments operate against a
background of legal norms that notably include a duty of care on the part of agents. All federal
actors under the Constitution exercise delegated authority (from “We the People”) as agents,
and thus all federal actors under the Constitution are bound by a duty of care. This duty has
much affinity with the business judgment rule of corporate law, in that the scope of the duty of
federal actors, as gleaned from eighteenth-century agency and corporate law, probably does not
exceed avoidance of gross negligence. Building on a forthcoming book entitled “ ‘A Great
Power of Attorney’: Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution,” which demonstrates in depth
the fiduciary character of the Constitution, this article examines the contours of the duty of care
that forms part of the background of every constitutional grant of power.

Suppose that you execute a power of attorney giving other people authority over a portion
of your affairs, such as management of some of your assets or control over your health-care
decisions. Or suppose that you yourself are made the guardian of your ailing grandparent
through such a document. How would you expect the designated agents in these scenarios to
carry out their tasks? How would the law expect them (or you) to do so?
The law’s answer is probably very close to most people’s intuitions: A power of attorney
creates a principal/agent, or fiduciary, relationship in which the agent exercising delegated
1
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authority is bound to act in accordance with the direct instructions of the principal and, in the
absence of such direct instructions, must abide by a set of default fiduciary obligations to the
principal, such as a duty to exercise personal judgment, a duty of loyalty to the principal, and a
duty of care when acting on behalf of the principal. 1 Accordingly, both you and the law would
expect the agent under such a fiduciary instrument to manage the principal’s affairs prudently,
thoughtfully, and carefully, and the law would enforce that expectation with stiff penalties. The
same expectation, again backed up by the threat of stiff legal sanctions, holds across an entire
family of fiduciary relationships, such as child/guardian, businessperson/factor, and
corporation/officer. A fiduciary’s duty of care is one of the most basic principles of agency law.
It is also one of the most basic principles underlying the United States Constitution.
While all of the prior examples of fiduciary obligations refer to private law rather than public
law, the law of agency is very pertinent – and, indeed, crucial – to understanding the relationship
between the United States government and the people over whom it exercises jurisdiction.
Federal officials, from the President to members of Congress to federal judges, receive
constitutionally delegated discretionary authority over a wide range of subjects. The
constitutional text allocates various powers to governmental actors, and it prescribes mechanisms
of oversight and supervision of those actors ranging from elections to impeachment proceedings.
The document, however, does not generally describe in any detail the manner in which
discretionary authority must be exercised. Nonetheless, as a matter of the Constitution’s original
* Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law; glawson@bu.edu. This article could not have been
written without the pioneering work of Robert G. Natelson, from whom we have learned. Portions of this article
adapt material from Chapter 7 of a book that is forthcoming from the University Press of Kansas. See GARY
LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION
(2017) (forthcoming). We are grateful to the University Press of Kansas for permission to draw upon that material.
** Professor of Law, The IDC Herzliya, Israel; gseidman@idc.ac.il.
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See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW (2011).
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meaning, 2 all federal powers must be implemented with the thoughtfulness, care, and prudence
that would be required of a private-law fiduciary in analogous circumstances. Translating that
fiduciary duty into ordinary language: All exercises of federal power must be reasonable. This
conclusion does not derive from the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which as an
interpretative matter simply cannot sustain any such load, or indeed from any other specific
constitutional provision. It derives instead from the very nature of the Constitution.
In a forthcoming book from the University Press of Kansas entitled “A Great Power of
Attorney”: Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution 3, we demonstrate at length that the
Constitution is most accurately viewed, for purposes of its interpretation, as a kind of fiduciary
instrument -- and specifically as a “great power of attorney,” to use the language of the foundingera giant James Iredell. 4

The legal maker of the Constitution, identified in the Preamble as “We

2

By “original meaning,” we mean the communicative signals intended to be conveyed by the Constitution’s legal
author, who is identified by the document itself as the hypothetical entity “We the People.” See Gary Lawson,
Reflections of an Empirical Reader (or, Could Fleming Be Right this Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457 (2016); Gary
Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENTARY 47 (2006). As an
operational matter, that intention effectively translates into the meaning that would have been attributed to the
document by a hypothetical reasonable observer at the time of the document’s making. See Lawrence B. Solum,
Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1119, 1136 (2015). We do not claim that
original meaning must be the only, or even a relevant, determinant of real-world decisions. That is a claim
concerning adjudicative theory, and our claims are limited solely to interpretative theory. On the crucial but oftoverlooked distinction between interpretative theory (what a document means) and adjudicative theory (how
decisions regarding a document should be made), see Gary Lawson, Originalism without Obligation, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 1309 (2013); Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L. REV. 1823 (1997).
Moreover, we do not claim that fiduciary theory provides insights into real-world decisions as a matter of positive
political theory or normative grounding for government as a matter of normative political theory. See Seth Davis,
The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145 (2014) (identifying many problems
with using fiduciary theory as a normative foundation for real-world decisions); Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob,
Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820 (2016) (same). Our claims, as we have said, strictly
concern the communicative meaning of a specific eighteenth-century document. We speak as lawyers, not as moral
or political theorists.
3

GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY
CONSTITUTION (2017) (forthcoming).
4
4 THE DEBATE IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 148-49 (Jonathan
Elliot, ed. 2d ed., 1907) (statement of James Iredell) (“[The Constitution] is a declaration of particular powers by the
people to their representatives, for particular purposes. It may be considered as a great power of attorney, under
which no power can be exercised but what is expressly given”) (emphasis added).
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the People,” 5 entrusted management of some portion of its affairs to various specified agents,
who must exercise their power on behalf of the designated beneficiaries who the Preamble
identifies as We the People and its “posterity.” 6 In the book, we show that the case for viewing
the Constitution as some species of fiduciary instrument is overwhelming. From classical
theory, with which all educated members of the founding generation would have been familiar,
through English country-party thought to founding-era republicanism, a fiduciary conception of
government infused late eighteenth-century political and legal thought. The principal drafters of
the Constitution – the members of the Committee of Detail – were private-law lawyers (Oliver
Ellsworth, Edmund Randolph, John Rutledge and James Wilson) familiar with drafting agency
instruments and a businessperson (Nathaniel Gorham) familiar with applying them. 7 The
general public in that era was far more acquainted with fiduciary instruments than is the general
public today. The more one looks at founding-era fiduciary documents, the more one sees them
reflected in the United States Constitution.
There were many kinds of eighteenth-century agency instruments, including powers of
attorney and corporate charters, from which provisions of the Constitution could have been – and
rather clearly were – drawn. In the book, we argue that there is a stronger case for seeing the
Constitution as akin to a power of attorney than for seeing it as some other kind of fiduciary
instrument, such a corporate charter, though that case is considerably less decisive than is the
5

U.S. CONST. Preamble.
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Id. (“We the People of the United States in Order to form a more perfect Union, to establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America”).
7

For an enlightening account of the work of the Committee of Detail, see William Ewald, The Committee of
Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENTARY 197 (2012). For an account of the familiarity of the Committee with agency law,
see Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in GARY LAWSON,
GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER
CLAUSE 84, 85-86 (2010).
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case for seeing the Constitution in agency terms broadly construed. We also show that once the
Constitution is seen in general agency terms, the background rules for ascertaining the meaning
of the document must be drawn, at least in large measure, from agency law. How one
interprets 8 a document depends on what kind of document one is interpreting. An agency-law
instrument is best interpreted in light of agency law, just as a poem is best interpreted in light of
the conventions associated with poetry and a shopping list is best interpreted in light of the
conventions typically employed by the author of the shopping list.
This article takes those demonstrations of the fiduciary character of the Constitution and
the implications of that character for discerning the Constitution’s meaning as jumping-off points
and explores one specific but crucial interpretative consequence of viewing the Constitution in
fiduciary or agency-law terms. Put simply: If agency-law instruments entail that agents are
bound by a duty of care, and if the Constitution is best seen as an agency-law instrument of some
kind, then constitutional agents are bound by duties of care. The conclusion, we think, would
have been obvious to a reasonable eighteenth-century audience.
For purposes of this article, it does not matter whether one analogizes the Constitution to
a power of attorney, a corporate charter, or any other specific kind of fiduciary instrument
(though that distinction might very well matter in other contexts). If the Constitution is best
understood and interpreted as any kind of agency instrument at all, it follows inexorably that
there are unenumerated but nonetheless constitutionally grounded limitations on virtually all of
the authority exercised by governmental actors. Those constraints affect the manner in which
those powers must be exercised, and they determine on whose behalf the exercise must take
place.
8

We use the word “interpret” to mean “ascertain the intended meaning of.” It is possible to use the word
“interpret” in other fashions, but we limit our use strictly to the positive ascertainment of communicative intentions.
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Understanding the Constitution as a species of agency instrument provides at least an
outline for understanding how and why these constraints are present. When agents receive
delegated authority, they receive that authority subject to a set of presumptive legal obligations
to exercise their authority in a certain way and on behalf of certain beneficiaries. Acceptance of
the role of agent, as understood in founding-era English common law, entailed a commitment to
provide service to the principal. Agents cannot use their power as they please, because the
power is not really their own; they are legally constrained by the very fact that they are acting as
agents, not in their personal capacities as private individuals. The agents’ duties of, inter alia,
care and loyalty form part of the background law of agency, and those duties will govern
relationships created by any particular agency instrument unless there is something in the
instrument that says otherwise. Nothing in the Constitution says otherwise.
Modern law, to a modest extent, recognizes this overarching requirement of
reasonableness in federal action, but it tends to locate it in the textually unpromising interstices
of the Due Process Clause and it does not necessarily calibrate the requirement of reasonableness
to the precise duty of care that the Constitution actually contemplates. Under the rubric of
“substantive due process,” all federal legislation must meet a minimum requirement of
rationality, though that minimum is so low that any imaginable rationale is considered sufficient
to sustain federal action unless the action implicates some judicially favored interests. 9 Under a
fiduciary understanding of the Constitution, the standard of care may well require more than
what passes for rationality under modern law, that standard does not necessarily vary with the
character of the interest involved, and the standard of care applies to all institutions of the

9

See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
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national government and not simply to Congress. The Constitution’s rationality requirement
runs far deeper than modern law acknowledges.
In this article, we consider the duties of care required by the Constitution of the President,
the federal courts, and Congress when those agents carry out their delegated tasks. We devote
most of our attention to Congress, partly because we have at least indirectly explored the duties
of the President and the federal courts elsewhere 10 and partly because the congressional duty of
care presents the best vehicle for considering the scope of that duty of care. It is one thing to say
that people have a certain duty; it is quite another to say what that duty requires. Because
fiduciary duties vary widely with context and circumstances, there are strict limits to the degree
of specificity that any such inquiry can yield. But drawing on principles of eighteenth-century
fiduciary and corporate law, we can at least begin to flesh out the extent to which the
Constitution’s very character purports to constrain the discretion of federal actors.

The President’s Duty of Care

The President of the United States presents perhaps the most obvious case for construing
constitutionally vested powers in light of background principles of fiduciary law. All federal
(and state) officials must “be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution,”11 but
only the President has the precise content of the oath specified in the Constitution: The President
must swear an oath saying: “I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States,
and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
10

Gary Lawson & Guy I. Seidman, Necessity, Propriety, and Reasonableness, in LAWSON, MILLER, NATELSON &
SEIDMAN, supra note 7, at 120.
11

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
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States.” 12 Fiduciary duties, of both loyalty (“faithfully) and care (“to the best of my Ability”),
are reflected in the constitutionally required oath of office. Accordingly, the President must
exercise all of his powers as must any other agent: with regard to the best interests of the
beneficiary (in this case We the People and its posterity), with impartiality among multiple
beneficiaries (as we have detailed elsewhere 13), and with due care. These are constitutional
obligations to the extent that the Constitution is an agency instrument that incorporates general
background rules of agency. 14
The idea that executive officers, such as the President, might be constitutionally bound to
exercise due care, loyalty, and impartiality in the exercise of their functions is not, or should not
be, at all a startling conclusion. We have previously reached essentially that same result through
a different path than we pursue here, 15 though in the end the two paths converge. The privatelaw background of agency that informs the Constitution elegantly dovetails with a related publiclaw background of obligations, such as those of due care, which we here summarize only briefly.
Through that public-law background, which began at least almost two centuries before the
Constitution was ratified, some basic principles of agency law were finding their way into the
legal norms regarding governmental administration.
By the time of the framing of the Constitution, there was a substantial body of English
administrative law governing delegations of power to governmental bodies. One of the most
basic principles underlying this law was the notion that grants of discretionary authority to
12

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (emphasis added).

13

Gary Lawson, Guy Seidman & Robert G. Natelson, The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94
B.U. L. REV. 415 (2014).

14
When and whether constitutional violations of the duty of care are impeachable offenses is a separate question
that would require another article. We note the issue without resolving it.
15

See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 10.
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executive agents had to be exercised reasonably, even when that requirement was not spelled out
in the grant.
This principle regarding the reasonable exercise of delegated governmental power is
typically traced to the 1598 decision in Rooke’s Case. 16 A statute gave sewer commissioners the
power to assess landowners for the costs of repairing water-control projects as the
commissioners “shall deem most convenient to be ordained.” 17 The commissioner used this
statute to assess the full costs of a repair on a single landowner, even though other landowners
were also benefited by the project. The court ruled for the assessed landowner because
“notwithstanding the Words of the commission give Authority to the commissioners to do
according to their Discretions, yet their Proceedings ought to be limited and bound with the Rule
of Reason and law. For Discretion is a Science or Understanding to discern between Falsity and
Truth, between Wrong and Right, between Shadows and Substance, between Equity and
colourable Glosses and Pretences, and not to do according to their Wills and private Affections
. . . .” 18 Executive discretion, even when textually unlimited, had to be exercised reasonably and
in a disinterested and impartial fashion.
Other decisions applied a similar principle regarding exercise of even very broadly
worded grants of discretion in statutes. In Keighley’s Case in 1609, a statute authorizing a sewer
commissioner to make rules “after your own wisdoms and discretions” was held to require the
agent to exercise discretion “according to law and justice.” 19 Other cases extended the principle

16

5 Co. Rep. 99b (1598). On Rooke’s Case as the foundational authority for the interpretation of delegated
powers, see WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 293-94 (10th ed, 2009).

17

23 Hen. 8, c. V, § 3, cl. 3 (1531).

18

5 Co. Rep. at 99b.

19

See Keighley’s Case, 10 Co. Rep. 139a, 140a (1609).

9

beyond sewer commissions to include all power delegated by statute. Estwick v. City of
London 20 stated in 1647 that “wheresoever a commissioner or other person had power given to
do a thing at his discretion, it is to be understood of sound discretion, and according to law.” 21
This constraint on the exercise of delegated executive power, which in England eventually came
to be called the principle of reasonableness, was firmly established by the end of the seventeenth
century. 22
The principle of reasonableness in the exercise of delegated power was powerfully
reiterated on the eve of the founding in 1773 in Leader v. Moxon. 23 Paving commissioners,
under a statute giving them power to pave or repair streets “in such a manner as the
commissioners shall think fit,” ordered a road repair that effectively buried the doors and
windows of plaintiff’s house. In awarding damages to the homeowner, the court wrote that the
agents “had grossly exceeded their Powers, which must have a reasonable construction. Their
Discretion is not arbitrary, but must be limited by Reason and Law.” 24 The court explained:
“[T]he Act could never intend that any of the Householders should . . . have their Houses buried
under Ground, and their Windows and Doors obstructed . . . . [H]ad Parliament intended to
demolish or render useless some houses for the Benefit or Ornament of the rest, it would have
given express Powers for the Purpose, and given an Equivalent for the loss that Individuals might
have sustained thereby.” 25

20

Styles 42 (1647).

21

Id. at 43 (emphasis added).

22

See STANLEY DE SMITH ET AL, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 297-98 (5th ed. 1995).

23

2 W. Bl. 924 (1781).

24

Id. at 925-26.

25

Id. at 926.
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These implicit constraints on governmental discretion were simply part of what it meant
to exercise delegated public power. According to these cases, discretion in governmental actors
must be exercised impartially (Rooke’s Case; Keighley’s Case), with attention to causal efficacy
(Keighley’s Case), in a measured and proportionate fashion (Leader v. Moxon), and with regard
for the rights of affected subjects (Leader v. Moxon). 26
To be sure, in English law the King (and Queen) had a special status – the royal
prerogative -- that created considerable ambiguity about the extent to which these norms applied
to him (and her), and more importantly about the extent to which various remedial mechanisms
applied in the event that one of the King’s subjects suffered legal wrong as a result of executive
action (or inaction). One of us has canvassed at length the shifting understandings of royal
accountability in England from Magna Carta through the eighteenth century, 27 and we cannot
rehearse that extensive discussion here. Suffice it to say that we are aware of very little support
for extending to the American presidency a strong immunity from responsibility for official
misfeasance or nonfeasance. Indeed, the fact that the Constitution specifically contemplates
impeachment and removal from office not only of subordinate executive officials, as was the
case in England, but also of the chief executive himself, 28 which English law did not recognize,
makes clear that at least some of the legal norms governing executive behavior bind the
President. We do not need to discuss here the remedies for executive misfeasance, such as

26

See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 10, at 120, 137-41 (elaborating the substantive requirements of
reasonableness contained in these cases).

27
Guy I. Seidman, The Origins of Accountability: Everything I Know about the Sovereign’s Immunity, I Learned
from King Henry III, 49 ST. LOUIS L.J. 393 (2005).
28

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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whether a writ of mandamus will properly lie against the President. 29 It is enough for us to say
that the President is not above the law and to move on, leaving questions of enforcement
mechanisms (if any) to another day.
Accordingly, when the federal Constitution vested “executive Power” in the President, 30
that grant of power carried with it the principle of reasonableness in its implementation as a
background principle of interpretation. Crucially, the requirements of the principle of
reasonableness, as those requirements would have been understood in the late eighteenth century,
are a good proxy for basic fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and impartiality. That is not
surprising. Given the powerful tradition in English and American law of viewing government in
fiduciary terms, which is detailed at great length in our book and elsewhere, 31 there is every
reason to think that the principle of reasonableness in English administrative law is simply
agency law applied to a governmental context in which the actual instruction or will of the
principal is difficult to ascertain but the general sentiment in favor of “proper” and “reasonable”
conduct is easier to grasp. Whether one calls it fiduciary duty or the principle of reasonableness,
the result is the same: While the President, as with any agent, has a range of choices in the means
used to carry out constitutionally assigned tasks, the choice is limited by background principles
that render some means of law execution off-limits. As we have said elsewhere: “Could the
president, exercising discretion in the selection of forms and means of law enforcement,
apprehend a suspect holed up in Concord by leveling the entire town . . . ? Could the president
in 1790, prior to ratification of the Fourth Amendment, exercise discretionary investigative
29

Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1868) (saying “no”).

30

U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

31

See Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the
Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239 (2007); Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the
Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004).
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powers by indiscriminately searching an entire region? We think that all of these measures
would be not merely ill-advised, but unconstitutional.” 32
The key point is that agency law, developed in English private law and then applied by
England's royal courts to public agents as well, suggests serious legal limits on the manner in
which the Constitution expects executive agents to carry out their tasks. It also suggests that
when engaging in permissible sub-delegation, the President must exercise due care in the
selection of sub-agents as well as in the decision to sub-delegate in the first place. The power to
sub-delegate, after all, is not a duty to sub-delegate. If the task is best done by the agent
personally (where “best” incorporates the idea of opportunity costs), then the agent must
personally perform the task. That is not simply wise administrative policy. It is constitutional
law.
We thus think that there is a sound foundation in the fiduciary character of the
Constitution for something resembling Gillian Metzger’s elaboration of a constitutional duty of
presidential supervision of subordinates. 33 Professor Metzger correctly points out that modern
law and scholarship tend to focus on questions of the President’s right to supervise subordinates
rather than questions of the President’s duty to supervise. 34 Even if one cannot derive that duty
directly from provisions such as the Take Care Clause 35 and the Oath Clause, 36 the fiduciary
character of the Constitution and the accompanying fiduciary character of the grant of executive
32

Lawson & Seidman, supra note 10, at 132-33.

33

See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836 (2015).

34

See id. at 1875.

35

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”).

36
See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. For arguments that one can indeed derive such a duty from those
provisions, see Metzger, supra note 30, at 1875-78; David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive
Power, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 83-87 (2009). We do not disagree with these arguments. We simply maintain that
they are subsumed under, and superseded by, the more basic point about the fiduciary character of the Constitution.
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power to the President are sufficient to provide a constitutional foundation for viewing the
President as a constrained agent rather than a free actor.
None of that says, of course, what the President’s duty of care entails in specific
circumstances. As we have intimated, there may not be a general answer to that kind of
question, given the contextual character of agency relationships. 37 We will say more about the
broad outlines of a constitutionally grounded fiduciary duty of care when we get to Congress
shortly.

Federal Judges’ Duty of Care

What about federal judges? Are they also subject to fiduciary duties because they
exercise a delegated “judicial Power” 38? Of course they are. Other scholars have tried to use
agency theory to formulate a general theory of judging in the American political order, 39 but we
are not going that far. We are only trying to interpret the meaning of the “judicial Power” in the
context of the federal Constitution. And in that context, agency law has much to say:
Suppose that a federal judge exercises his or her delegated power to decide a case
by consulting an Ouija board. The judge's decision could certainly be reversed on
appeal. The judge could certainly be impeached and removed by Congress. But
more profoundly, the judge has violated the Constitution. There is nothing in
Article III that expressly says that judges must decide cases rationally or sensibly,
but given the eighteenth-century background norms regarding delegated
37

Accord: Metzger, supra note 33, at 1901.

38

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

39

Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CAL. L. REV. 699 (2013).
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governmental power, there would be no need for such a specification. Courts are
delegated the judicial power, which includes as a necessary element the
discretionary power to choose a decision-making methodology. It would simply
be taken as given by a founding-era reasonable observer that the delegation to the
courts, although seemingly without any internal textual limit, carries the implicit
requirement that the power be exercised reasonably. There is substantial room
within that grant of power for different methodologies, and even substantial room
for error that does not rise to a constitutional violation, but at some point a
judgment falls so far off the map that it simply ceases to be an exercise of the
judicial power. Put another way: Not everything done by a judge, even in the
guise of deciding a case, is an exercise of judicial power (or jurisdiction) within
the meaning of Article III. The limits may be broad, but there are limits. 40
As we noted above, Ethan Leib, David Ponet, and Michael Serota have argued that all
American judges, both state and federal, are subject to basic fiduciary duties, and they have
sought to derive a robust theory of proper behavior from the nature of the judicial role as
established in England and the North-American colonies (if not more widely). They seek to
identify “fiduciary duties that . . . are widely applicable to all judges.” 41 We do not disagree with
their general characterization of the role of judges; after all, until fairly recently in AngloAmerican legal history judges were considered a kind of executive official, and we have just
seen that there is a long tradition of holding executive officials to fiduciary standards. We agree
that fiduciary principles are a powerful way in which to ground familiar ideals of judicial

40

Lawson & Seidman, supra note 10, at 132.

41

Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra note 39, at 730.
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impartiality 42 and responsibility. 43 We are less persuaded that one can derive a judicial duty of
“deliberative engagement” with the public. 44 Federal judges are charged with a very specific
task – deciding cases or controversies in accordance with governing law – and it is far from
obvious how deliberative engagement uniformly promotes that task. But in this article we do not
claim principles beyond those that we have identified here as applicable to federal judges by
virtue of their constitutional office. Such principles may well exist, but we do not claim them
here. And again, the scope of the appropriate duty of care requires more explanation.
We shall now see, in the context of Congress, how much guidance one can draw about
that duty from background principles of agency law.

Congress’s Duty of Care

The principle of reasonableness in English administrative law applied to agents
exercising authority delegated from Parliament, but Parliament itself was not bound by that
principle because Parliament did not exercise delegated authority; it was supreme. “Indeed, the
law imposed no substantive limits, of reasonableness or otherwise, on the legislative supremacy
of Parliament, which stood above the other two governmental departments in the legal
hierarchy.” 45
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Id. at 731-33.
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Under the American Constitution, however, Congress exercises delegated authority just
as does the President and the federal judiciary. Once it is seen that the Constitution is
fundamentally an agency instrument, there is no reason to exempt some of the designated agents
from the background norms that accompany agency instruments absent some specific provision
in the instrument that explicitly overrides those background norms. Accordingly, it is evident
that Congress is also bound by a duty of care when it exercises discretionary authority. If an
agent is charged with managing or spending another person’s money, of course the agent must
exercise due care when dealing with those assets. Congress manages money – a staggeringly
enormous amount of money – on behalf of We the People and its posterity. The idea that
Congress has a duty of care when executing that task, and its other constitutionally delegated
tasks, is almost too elementary to articulate.
Put in interpretative terms: All of the power grants in the Constitution come with an
implicit coda to the effect of: “to be exercised in a reasonable fashion in accordance with basic
fiduciary norms.” The fiduciary duty of care is part of the interpretative background of the
document. The real question for us concerns the scope and content of that duty. 46
In our forthcoming book, we spend considerable energy discussing whether the
Constitution is best seen as a kind of power of attorney or as some other kind of fiduciary
instrument, such as a corporate charter. There are strong similarities between the Constitution
and corporate charters of the eighteenth century, so we readily concede that the case for viewing
the Constitution in corporate terms is quite powerful 47 (though in the end we think less powerful
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Others may be equally or more interested in the mechanisms, if any, by which those duties are enforced.
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For enlightening expositions of that case in various contexts, see Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of
Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006); Eric Enlow, The Corporate Conception of the State and the Origins of
Limited Constitutional Government, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2001); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate
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than the case for viewing it as a power of attorney). It is an intriguing question whether the
precise characterization of the Constitution as a specific kind of fiduciary instrument might make
a difference in the content of the norm of due care. In the end, we think that it most likely does
not matter, but the considerations involved are subtle enough to warrant a close look, especially
as those considerations point towards the appropriate standard of care that is incorporated into
the Constitution as a background rule of interpretation.
Suppose that one thinks that the Constitution can be analogized to a corporate charter. In
that case, one might reason that agents such as Congress are best viewed as corporate directors
who determine the general path of the enterprise (and executive and judicial officials might be
analogized to managers, though they might fit the role of directors as well for certain designated
tasks). Under basic principles of modern-day corporate law, the directors are subject to fiduciary
duties of care, but their exercise of discretionary judgment is evaluated pursuant to the so-called
“business judgment rule,” in which there is “a presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. A hallmark of the business
judgment rule is that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the latter's
decision can be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.’ ” 48 This suggests that the
constitutionally implied duty of care, while quite real, is highly deferential to the extent that such
a duty conforms to contemporary practice under corporate law. But from the standpoint of
original meaning, contemporary practice is not the place to look for the appropriate duty of care.

Law Background of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in LAWSON, MILLER, NATELSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 7, at
144.
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Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (citations omitted). For a brief overview of the
modern business judgment rule, see Mary Siegel, The Illusion of Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. PA. J.
BUS. L.599, 602-08 (2013).
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One must look instead to eighteenth-century baselines. Would the eighteenth-century duty of
care of fiduciaries under corporate law, a power of attorney, or other kind of fiduciary instrument
be more constraining than the minimalist modern corporate law standard of care?
This is a much more difficult question to answer than it might at first seem. Our present
bottom line is actually that the duty of care that forms an interpretative backdrop for
understanding all constitutionally vested powers is in fact approximated reasonably well by the
modern business judgment rule. It is possible for decisions of governmental actors to be so far
outside the normal range of discretion that they amount to a breach of this bedrock fiduciary
duty, but the standard is much more forgiving than one of simple error, and it probably does not
even reach the “prudent person” standard that modern fiduciary law would likely apply to a wide
range of contemporary agency relationships. But, as we will shortly see, that does not
necessarily make the standard equivalent to so-called “rational basis” analysis under current
constitutional doctrine. The business judgment rule, today and in the eighteenth century, is
highly deferential, but it is not a free pass.
Start with the eighteenth-century duty of care of fiduciaries outside of the corporate
setting. The law in that regard seems to have been relatively thin. Partly that is a function of the
splintered character in earlier times of what today we call fiduciary law, which did not exist as a
unified, unitary body of doctrine in the founding era. Executors, guardians, and factors, for
example, each had their own standards to meet, and generalizing across those standards is
difficult, in part because cases are likely to turn on the language of particular instruments and the
specific facts presented.
Professor Robert Natelson has studied this question of founding-era fiduciary standards
for far longer and in far more depth than have we, and he concludes regarding the common
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threads among the various eighteenth-century understandings of duties of care: “The ‘reasonable
man’ standard seems not to have been in use yet, but the duty was expressed as an obligation not
to neglect the business nor to be guilty of ‘folly or negligence’ or, in some cases, as an obligation
to avoid ‘supine’ or ‘extreme’ negligence or crassa neglegentia (gross negligence). If a fiduciary
acted in an ‘unreasonable or indiscrete’ way, a court . . . also could hold fiduciaries liable . . . .” 49
This relatively deferential standard actually makes a great deal of sense for an era in which
fiduciaries were often not professionals but were simply ordinary citizens acting as executors,
guardians, and the like. 50 An overly strict standard of care would make serving in those
positions very risky, and the social costs of discouraging people from serving in those fiduciary
capacities would have been enormous. A “business judgment” rule as a baseline (from which
any instrument could, if it so chose, depart in either direction) is an understandable first
approximation of a generalized fiduciary standard of care in the eighteenth century.
Was that business judgment norm also the eighteenth-century standard of care for
corporate directors and officers, so that the interpretative result would be the same whether one
sees the Constitution as a power of attorney or as a corporate charter? 51 That is an even harder
question to answer because there appears to be relatively little founding-era law on the fiduciary
duties of corporate directors. The corporation itself was a fiduciary for its owners and was even
deemed to hold the stock of its owners as a trustee. The corporate stock was treated, for legal
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Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending, supra note 31 at 258-59 (copious footnotes omitted).
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See Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in LAWSON, MILLER,
NATELSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 7, at 52, 56.
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We are assuming that the standard of care for corporate directors and officers is substantially similar. We gather
that this assumption is not as straightforward as it might seem to outsiders to corporate law. See Megan Wischmeier
Shaner, Restoring the Balance of Power in Corporate Management: Enforcing an Officer’s Duty of Obedience, 66
BUS. LAW. 27, 29 (2010) (indicating that Delaware courts did not equate director and officer fiduciary duties until
2009 and suggesting that the scopes of the relevant duties of care remain uncertain).
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purposes, as an asset of the corporation, and the stockholders were beneficiaries of the resulting
equitable trust. The idea that the stock actually belongs to the stockholders rather than the
corporate entity did not gain broad acceptance until the early nineteenth century. 52
This conception of the corporation as an owner and trustee came out in 1723 in Child v.
Hudson’s Bay Co., 53 in which both the corporation and an outside creditor made claims on the
stock of a bankrupt stockholder. The corporation had a by-law stating that if any member
(stockholder) of the company incurred a debt to the corporation, the stock was to be used first to
satisfy the debt to the corporation. The outside creditor denied that the corporation could,
through a by-law, effectively make itself a secured creditor. The court ruled in favor of the
corporation: “This is a good bye-law; for the legal interest of all the stock is in the company, who
are trustees for the several members . . . .” 54 Once the company is identified as a trustee, then of
course background fiduciary principles come into play. We have, however, found little
elaboration of the content of those principles in the corporate law context, especially in regard to
the duty of care.
In addition, there was some eighteenth-century authority for imposing fiduciary duties
directly on the directors and officers of corporations in their personal capacities. The most
illuminating case that we have identified is Charitable Corporation v. Sutton. 55 The case
concerned a massive fraud against the company, which had been created as a lending institution,
perpetrated by some of its officers. Thompson, the company’s warehouse keeper, was the officer
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at the center of the fraud, which involved issuing loans (often to the officer himself) far in excess
of the company’s assets. 56 Thompson had “run away out of the kingdom in order to avoid
justice,” 57 and the company sought to hold the committee-men, who would be the equivalent of
modern directors, liable for the losses. There were allegations of nonfeasance in failing to
monitor the situation and for malfeasance in appointing some of the perpetrators to positions of
authority. The basic claim of the plaintiffs, as described by the court, was that the defendant
committee-men “have been guilty of manifest breaches of trust, or at least of such supine and
gross negligence of their duty, and so often repeated, that it will amount to a breach of trust.” 58
The court found the committee-men clearly liable for “actual breaches of trust” for
several events:
The bye-law prescribes, that when notes were to be issued by the cashier,
they should be signed by one of the committee-men, and intended as a check upon
the warehouse-keeper and cashier.
Now several notes have been issued, without observing this rule, which is
an express contravention of the bye-law.
A registry of pledges was kept, in which an entry is made of the value of
the goods pawned: after this was done, a new loan is made upon the same pledge,
to the same person, and a reference to the old number in the registry upon every
new advance; so that it may be called a pedigree of loans through twenty
descents.
56

The corporation’s charter specifically forbade this kind of fractional-reserve banking. See id. (noting that the
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Now it is not in the nature of the thing possible to suppose, that the same
person wanting to re-borrow could replace the first money lent; and therefore at
the out-set was a plain and obvious fraud.
....
As to the third breach of trust, the committee-men’s behavior, with regard
to Thompson their warehouse-keeper.
It is such a notorious fraud, or at least gross inattention, to suffer him, who
was to set a value on all the pledges, to borrow money upon them himself; that, I
shall direct those who shall appear to be guilty of it to make good the loss. 59
“Gross inattention” in supervision thus amounted to a breach of trust.
Other charges of breach of trust against the committeemen alleged what amounts to
mismanagement. The original design of the corporation included an officer “called the surveyor
of the warehouse, whose business it was to examine all the pledges taken in by the warehousekeeper.” 60 However, “[i]n September 1726, the surveyor of the warehouse was discharged, and
there was never any appointed afterwards; so that all the checks upon the warehouse-keeper were
taken away.” 61 The removal of the mechanism for oversight of Thompson was alleged to be a
breach of trust. So was “making several orders to put it in the power of Thompson, Woolley, and
Warren, to commit those frauds.” 62 Though these “are not so clearly breaches of trust,” the court
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found that those who “issued out the orders, which invested Thompson, Woolley, and Warren,
with such powers” 63 would be liable.
Even more interesting are the charges against the committee-men for crassa negligentia,
or gross negligence in modern parlance. Those claims were founded on “1st, The committeemen’s non-attendance upon their employment. 2dly, Their not observing the bye-law of law of
laying the balance of cash regularly before them. 3dly, Not taking any notice of forfeited
pledges. 4thly, Never once inspecting the warehouse to see what number of real pledges were
there. 5thly, Putting the whole power into the hands of Thompson, Woolley, and Warren.” 64 The
court determined that “committee-men are most properly agents to those who employ them in
this trust, and who empower them to direct and superintend the affairs of the corporation.” 65
Accordingly, the committee-men were under a duty of care to the corporation and its owners.
But in what reads like an early anticipation of the business judgment rule, the court observed:
“Now where acts are executed within their authority, as repealing bye-laws and making orders,
in such cases though attended with bad consequences, it will be very difficult to determine that
these are breaches of trust. For it is by no means just in a judge, after bad consequences have
arisen from such executions of their power, to say that they foresaw at the time what must
necessarily happen; and therefore were guilty of a breach of trust.” 66 This is a very deferential
standard. There is language in the opinion suggesting something a bit less deferential: “By
accepting of a trust of this sort, a person is obliged to execute it with fidelity and reasonable
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diligence . . . .” 67 The ultimate standard, however, was whether “there should appear to be a
supine negligence . . . [in] not making use of the proper power invested in them by the charter, in
order to prevent the ill consequences arising from such a confederacy.” 68
Although “[n]o case seems to have arisen in the United States during the period from
1800 to 1830 in which the principles of fiduciary law were applied to the directors or officers of
business corporations,” 69 we see no reason to think that American law was materially different
from English law in these respects. Professor Dodd, in his extensive study of early American
corporate law, had “no doubt that American lawyers and judges of the period with which we are
concerned were well aware of the fact that English law had long insisted that persons who act for
others in such capacities as agents, partners, trustees, guardians, executors, or administrators
must observe a high standard of loyalty to those whose property interests have been entrusted to
their charge.” 70
The best summary that we can exact from these materials is that eighteenth-century
fiduciaries generally, whether attorneys or corporate directors, had a duty of care as a baseline
part of their obligations, but that the standard of care that could be legally enforced was akin to a
standard of gross negligence. To the extent that the Constitution is a fiduciary instrument, of any
plausible kind to which it can be analogized, federal actors must exercise their discretion at least
in accordance with this standard.

67

Id. at 645.

68

Id.

69

EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
MASSACHUSETTS 70 (1954).
70

Id.

25

Interestingly, that conclusion is not very far removed from ideas that are central to
modern constitutional law, though modern law does not ground its principles in fiduciary notions
or conform to them precisely. The contemporary business judgment rule in corporate law is
often cast as a “rational basis” test, in which the decision of a board of directors will be upheld if
it “can be attributed to any rational business purpose,” 71 though the standard is also sometimes
framed as one of “gross negligence,” as was the evident eighteenth-century standard. 72 For
students of American constitutional law, the term “rational basis” has immediate resonance.
In 1938, the Supreme Court famously declared that congressional legislation that did not
implicate certain judicially-favored interests (which today are generally called “fundamental
rights”) “is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or
generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.” 73 Four years earlier, in a
case involving state rather than federal legislation, the Court said: “If the laws passed are seen to
have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied.” 74 The clear implication is that
legislation is to be pronounced unconstitutional if it cannot be assumed to rest upon a rational
basis or to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose. That is, the implication is
that there is a general background norm of rationality with which any legislation must comply.
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While it may be difficult to find legislation that is so absurd that it will not sustain a presumption
of legislative rationality (just as it may be difficult to find business decisions so preposterous that
no presumption of responsible judgment can be indulged with respect to them), it is not
impossible to do so. The Supreme Court has even found a federal statute refusing to recognize
state definitions of marriage that include same-sex couples to be irrational and therefore
invalid, 75 though the case obviously implicated other, more particularized concerns even if the
decision did not precisely identify them. Numerous cases announce the rational basis standard
while finding it satisfied.
It is very difficult to find a textual hook for this kind of “rational basis review,” as it has
come to be called. The cases involving action by state officials typically invoke the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but even if that was a plausible ground for such
a requirement in the context of state actors, there is no express Equal Protection Clause
applicable to the federal government. 76 Certainly the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is an unlikely home for it, for reasons that have oft been given about the
implausibility of “substantive due process” as an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. 77
The background duty of care imposed by fiduciary theory, however, just might fit the
bill. Indeed, the eighteenth-century duty of care may even be slightly more rigorous than
75
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modern “rational basis” review, though that is hard to glean with any confidence from the
eighteenth-century law. The founding-era cases support a fiduciary standard of gross negligence.
Modern rational basis inquiry excuses even gross negligence; it allows laws to stand if one can
imagine a rationale for them, even if the actors did not actually formulate or rely upon that
rationale. Agency law arguable demands a bit more than modern rational basis inquiry provides.
In any event, once government actors are seen as fiduciaries of any sort at all, the idea that their
actions are entirely unconstrained by law other than express prohibitions in the governing
instrument is quite absurd. Any such result would have to come from an explicit statement in a
document that the governing background law of fiduciary instruments was superseded. There is
nothing in the United States Constitution even resembling such a provision. Substantive due
process may well be an oxymoron, and also an implausible interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment, but from the standpoint of original meaning rational basis review of federal
legislation has a very potent constitutional pedigree. And, as we have seen, the case for
imposing such a standard on federal executive and judicial officials is at least as strong. If
Congress is bound by fiduciary standards, then a fortiori so are the President and federal judges.
The reasonableness requirement of fiduciary law also suggests that there is no good
reason to think that executive officials should be held to a lower standard of rationality than are
legislators, as modern case law would have it. 78 Federal actors are all agents, each charged with
specific tasks. The nature of the tasks lead to differences in the application of fiduciary
standards, but it is far from obvious that some tasks call for a lower standard than others, 79 just as
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it is far from obvious that corporate officers should be subject to a different fiduciary standard
than corporate directors.

Conclusion

The idea that federal governmental action should, as an ideal, be reasonable is not
especially controversial. But finding a textually grounded constitutional basis for turning that
desideratum into an actual legal norm has been a different story. Once the Constitution is seen as
an agency instrument, however, the requirement of reasonableness follows quite easily as a
matter of original meaning – not from a specific textual provision but from the nature of the text
itself. One does not need the oxymoronic label “substantive due process” to describe this
reasonableness requirement. It derives from the basic fiduciary duty of care.
We hasten to add that it is an entirely different question from those that we address here
whether state laws or state executive or judicial officials are subject to a constitutionally
grounded reasonableness review. Modern law unquestionably subjects state actors to some such
standard via the Fourteenth Amendment, but it is not at all clear that this practice is (or is not)
constitutionally grounded under our analysis. Because the Constitution does not generally
empower state officials and state legislators (with some modest exceptions 80), those actors are
not subject to the background fiduciary standards that underlie the federal Constitution when
they act within the compass of their state authority. It is possible that their own state
constitutions impose those standards, but that is something that would have to be determined on
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a state-by-state basis. It is also possible that, while substantive due process is a very tough sell
under the Fifth Amendment, it might be a more plausible understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment that was enacted in 1868. 81
Thus, it is compatible with everything that we have said here to maintain either (1) that
there is no general rationality requirement for state action, (2) that there is a general rationality
requirement for state action that is equivalent to the requirement for federal action , (3) that there
is a general rationality requirement for state action that is stricter than the requirement for federal
action, or (4) that there is a general rationality requirement for state action that is less demanding
than the requirement for federal action. Choosing among those alternatives involves matters
well beyond the scope of our analysis, which is confined to a study of the Constitution of 1788.
Our claim here is only that, as a matter of original meaning, some kind of general requirement of
reasonableness for federal action, whether cast as a modestly revamped “rational basis” review
or as akin to a “business judgment” rule, is a background interpretative norm of the Constitution
of 1788. 82
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